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1. Introduction
The EU takes on an active role in the promotion of human rights around the world. The Treaty of
Lisbon, one of the founding treaties of the EU, puts the issue of human rights at the forefront of
European international policies. Whereas the promotion of human rights has been more effective
with countries hoping to become members, 1 there is a role for the EU in the protection of human
rights around the world. The EU Delegations, as a matter of fact, are key to this role, as is the
European External Action Service (EEAS). This research therefore aims at examining the work
done so far in terms of human rights promotion, with the hope of providing suggestions on what
challenges need to be faced to improve the EU's role on the matter.
This thesis will research the subject of human rights promotion in the international context, using
Cuba as a case study. Since 1959 Cuba has been ruled by a Communist government, led by Fidel
Castro until 2008, when power was transferred to his brother Raul. During the Cold War, Cuba
allied itself with the Soviet Union and became part of the Eastern bloc (Gaddis 2005). After the
Soviet Union was dismantled, Cuba found itself almost isolated from the rest of the world, but –
unlike other countries formerly belonging to the same bloc – its government did not crumble. Some
European states had made steps to start a constructive dialogue with the Caribbean country during
the Cold War, 2 but it was only at the beginning of the 1990s that an actual political dialogue
between Cuba and the EU started being considered.
Whereas the High Representative is confident about the recent round of negotiations, 3 steps have
been small and slow, as the EU has often criticized Cuba for its poor human rights record and the
Communist government has clearly expressed its hostility towards any move that is viewed as an
intrusion in its internal affairs. The two parties have often found themselves on opposite sides of the
international context and the EU is seen as close to the USA as far as policies against Cuba are
concerned (Pérez Milián 2008), even though it has often criticized the embargo. As will be
explained later, Cuba's view on human rights can be considered as a challenge to the Western idea
that they are universal and indivisible (Gordy and Lee 2009). This thesis therefore considers Cuba
as a worst-case scenario against which to test the EU's role in promoting human rights abroad. The
analysis seeks to understand what the main challenges are in carrying out this task for the EU.
The first chapter outlines the main theoretical approaches to international relations and explains
1 Interview with President Prodi, (8 May 2015) over the phone.
2 Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
3 Brief conversation with Vice-President Mogherini, (16 April 2015) The Hague.
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why, in order to study the promotion of human rights, more focus is needed on negotiations and
norm entrepreneurship. This thesis mostly takes a constructivist approach, and views the EU as a
possible norm entrepreneur of human rights. In order to do this, however, it is important to consider
how the norm “human rights” has developed in recent history, especially in reference to the Cold
War (since it was a key period for Cuba). Also, it is important to consider that the EU might still be
better viewed as a group of norm entrepreneurs (member states), rather than a single one, which
means that particular attention needs to be paid to the role of national interests in the promotion of
human rights.
The second chapter, then, describes the methodology used for the research and analysis of the
topic. This chapter also contains an explanation of the research question and lays out the
hypotheses, which are an attempt at suggesting a series of factors that may have impacted the
relationship between the EU and Cuba and, therefore, the EU's role in promoting human rights in
the island. Moreover, the second chapter explains the division of the case study into three different
time periods, which was important in order to allow for possible within-case variations. The first
time period consists of the time when the EU's Common Position on Cuba was being elaborated
(between 1992 and 1996), while the second is based on a period of particular distrust between the
two parties, culminating in the so-called Cocktail Wars between 2003 and 2005. Finally, the last
period focusses on the present negotiation process, including intra-EU discussion on which steps to
take.
The following chapters reflect this division and consist of the actual analysis. The last time
period (going from 2008 to nowadays) is divided into two different chapters, because it is the one
that provides most information on how the EU promotion of human rights is working presently.
After having outlined the analysis, the thesis will end some conclusions, consisting of a summary of
the main findings and of some suggestions for future research.
The analysis was carried out through a qualitative approach, using both primary and secondary
sources. Documents produced by all EU institutions were key to understanding how the EU
promotion of human rights has worked in the past two decades and are often cited in the research.
Interviews with practitioners were also particularly valuable to gather first-hand information on the
development of the EU-Cuba relationship. The people interviewed are all from the EU and have
worked either on the issue of human rights promotion or of relations with Cuba at different levels.
The thesis could have benefited greatly from interviews with officials from Cuban institutions, but
it was not possible to arrange them during the time the research was being conducted. The
6
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Appendix is dedicated to an explanation of how interviews were devised and organized.
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2. Theoretical background
2.1 Negotiations as Part of the Realism VS Constructivism Debate
Realist approaches to international relations stress the importance of self-interest and security
issues. The world is dominated by rational actors who make strategic choices about the way they
interact with each other in order to ensure their own safety (Mearsheimer 1995). States, therefore,
are in a continuous struggle for their own survival and their behaviour depends on this struggle
(Waltz 1979). Cooperation can only arise if states believe that it goes to their advantage and that it
puts them in a position of control over the world (Waltz 1979). In this perspective, the most
powerful states strive to keep their power while the less powerful ones try to climb up to a better
position.
This approach to international relations is reflected in theories that view negotiations as sets of
strategic choices made with the sole purpose of improving the international position of a country.
States, therefore, carry out a process of measuring the costs and benefits related to each negotiation
step, while also trying to manage possible risks (Hampson, Crocker and Aall 2007). There is a high
level of suspicion, because each state is aware of the fact that the other actors are also trying to use
the process to their own advantage. Their behaviour is dictated by their rationality and self-interest,
and this makes it unlikely that the dialogue process involved in a negotiation will build actual trust
among the parties (Hampson, Crocker and Aall 2007).
Liberal institutionalism shares the realist view of the world as a system in which actors compete
for their survival, but adds that trust can be built through the establishment of international
institutions (Keohane and Martin 1995). This approach highlights the fact that there are cases in
which states deem it safer to come together and cooperate. Institutions help diminish the fear of
what the other actor might do by increasing the level of information-sharing and by imposing
penalties on the states that “cheat” (Keohane and Martin 1995). In this perspective, the EU is an
actor in its own right with its own self-interests, which it will try to push forward through various
means. In negotiations with other countries or institutions it will behave as states do in a realist
world.
Hopman (2010) however, argues that a realist approach to international negotiations might be
too limited and might not reflect the high level of complexity of a negotiation process. He argues
that negotiations are a system of interactions that may change the behaviour of states and even pull
it away from their self-interest (Hopman 2010). As a matter of fact, the interests of states in a
8
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negotiation may change depending on how they interact. By entering a negotiation process and by
interacting with one another, states are influenced by the interdependent system they act in. Their
interests and positions, therefore, are determined by the process they go through, rather than being
fixed strategic choices. In a constructive perspective structure and agents shape each other, which in
a negotiation context translates into the dependence of actors' preferences on how the negotiation
itself is carried out.
Similarly, Onuf (2013) stresses the importance of applying a constructivist framework to
international relations, by arguing that rules and preferences are shaped by the process. He revisits
Waltz' realist theory to show how close his idea of structure actually is to that of constructivism
(Onuf 2009). Rather than being fixed and unchangeable, structure is constructed in our minds (Onuf
2009). As far as negotiations are concerned, this means that the structure in which they develop
(e.g. the internal rules of the negotiation and the actor's interests) can be perceived differently by
each actor at different points of the process and can change accordingly. Boyer et al. (2005) go as
far as arguing that the importance of a negotiation process lies with the outcomes it produces in
terms of attitudes and rules that are introduced in the interaction between the parties. A
constructivist approach to negotiations, therefore, is particularly important because it highlights the
outcomes it can have in terms of changing the parties' interests.
In order to better understand negotiations between the EU and Cuba this will, therefore, take a
constructivist approach. As it will be explained in the next section, this will give an opportunity to
see the EU as a norm entrepreneur trying to promote the rule of human rights. As Hopman (2010)
argues, a constructivist perspective will also help me analyse negotiations as a complex system of
interaction, where each step is based on more than self-interest. Given the number of factors
involved in negotiations between the EU and Cuba (e.g. EU member states' interests, the
relationship between the US and Cuba, cultural differences, etc...) it is particularly important to
avoid reducing them to a simple game of risk-management and benefit-maximisation. However, an
account of national interests also needs to be considered when exploring the issue of how different
EU member states have internalized the norm “human rights”. As a matter of fact, as will be shown
in the explanation of the third hypothesis, it might be that there are different perspectives on the
issue within the EU.
2.2 Norm Entrepreneurs in Negotiations
A constructivist approach to negotiations involving the EU needs to take into account an
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understanding of the institution as a possible “norm entrepreneur”. Sunstein (1996) studied social
norms at length and argued that they can have a strong influence on human behaviour. As a matter
of fact, he argues that social norms and rationality are intertwined to the point that the latter depends
on the former (Sunstein 1996). However, social norms can also easily be changed by people who
have an interest in doing so. Sunstein (1996) calls these people “norm entrepreneurs” and explains
that they can introduce new norms when they manage to overcome the free rider problem.
Whereas Sunstein's studies are mostly focussed on the national domain, Finnemore and Sikkink
(1998) take his argument further and apply the concept of norm construction and socialization to the
field of international relations. In their perspective, once a state has internalized a certain norm it
may be imitated by others (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Whether other states will adopt the norm
also depends on the position of the state that has already adopted it and, in a way, the relationship
between them (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As far as the EU is concerned, it might be the case
that countries with a prospect of becoming members will be more likely to imitate those that are
already members, especially on issues that are directly linked to the Union's interests.
As Rushton puts it, the ultimate goal of norm entrepreneurs in international relations is to
persuade other countries of the legitimacy of the norm in question (Rushton 2008). This is a
complex process that, from a constructivist point of view, involves communication and interaction
between the norm entrepreneur and other actors with the aim of changing the actors' preferences
(Payne 2001). It is important to consider, however, that this process is bound to find resistance,
because the states being confronted by the entrepreneur are likely to already have their own norms
in place.
Elgstrom (2000) makes an important point in relation to this issue, when he argues that more
attention should be paid to international negotiations when studying the process of norm
socialization. Since the new rules are likely to clash with those already in place in other states, norm
entrepreneurs need to be ready to convince others that the new rule is valid. At the same time, in
order to be internalized by the institutions already in place in other countries, the norm needs to go
through a process of translation rather than simple imitation (Elgstrom 2000). This interaction
between the norm entrepreneur and other actors involves a great deal of bargaining and
compromising and can be described as a negotiation (Elgstrom 2000). 
A communication-based approach views negotiations as based on dialogues that should address
the basic needs of the parties. Moreover, negotiations, in this perspective, often aim at changing the
perceptions and attitudes of the parties involved (Hampson, Crocker and Aall 2007). These
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approaches also stress the importance of building trust among the parties (Hampson, Crocker and
Aall 2007). As mentioned earlier, trust is not possible in a world only dominated by self-interest
(apart from those situations where an intergovernmental institution allows it). However, if we take
into account the process described by Elgstrom (2000) and by most literature on norm
entrepreneurship, we can only understand international negotiations as a continuous process of
dialogue where trust can be built through a number of steps. 
2.3 The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur
Having reviewed the literature on norm entrepreneurship and having explained why a
constructivist approach to negotiations is relevant, it is now important to asses whether the EU can
actually be considered a norm entrepreneur trying to promote the norm “human rights”. In order to
be a norm entrepreneur, a state (or, in this case, an institution) must have already internalized the
norm in question. The fact that the EU has internalized the human rights norm is evidenced by the
issuance, in 2000, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees a large number of human
rights. Moreover, all member states are parties to the UN (and have therefore ratified the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights) and to the two International Covenants on Human Rights. Finally,
they all have also signed the European Convention on Human Rights, which is the basis for the
European Court of Human Rights. As a matter of fact, a particular attention to issues of democracy
and human rights has been a core component of the common identity of EU member states since the
early 1990s (Merlingen, Mudde and Sedelmeier 2001). 
As mentioned above, however, the main objective of a norm entrepreneur is to convince others
to adopt the norm in question. As far as this step of norm entrepreneurship is concerned, the EU has
expressed its commitment to promoting human rights abroad in the Treaty of Lisbon, which
affirms:
“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality
and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms […]” (Treaty of
Lisbon, art. 24.1)
All negotiations with third countries, therefore, have a strong focus on the issue of human rights.
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For example, in all trade agreements signed by the EU a “human rights clause” has been included
since the early 1990s as part of the general increase in attention for human rights by member states
(Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 2014). Moreover, the EU actively supports
regional and non-governmental organizations that advocate and promote human rights (European
External Action Service 2015). The norm can therefore be considered as already internalized by the
Union.
Perhaps the clearest example of how the EU has tried to persuade other countries to accept the
human rights norm is the Eastern enlargement. When the Cold War ended and the prospect of
former Communist countries becoming member states appeared, the Copenhagen criteria were laid
out (Conant 2014). According to these criteria, no state can become part of the EU if it does not
respect the rule of democracy and human rights (European Commission 2015). Observers have
argued that this conditionality has been a more successful strategy to induce respect for human
rights than any other international agreement (Conant 2014). Moreover, as it will be explained later,
the Eastern enlargement was also an opportunity for the EU to develop its own discourse on human
rights in relation to any third country. 4
2.4 Human Rights as a Norm
An understanding of human rights as a norm that the EU is trying to push needs to take into
account their division into two categories. During the Cold War, as a matter of fact, two sets of
human rights developed: the civil and political ones, and the social and economic ones. The former
used to be linked to the Western bloc (Klabbers 2013), which placed more attention on rights such
as the freedom of expression, of association and of non-discrimination. The leaders of the Eastern
block, on the other hand, argued that these rights were useless if the social and economic ones were
not guaranteed (Klabbers 2013). For example, people cannot have the energy to exercise their
freedom of expression if they do not have food to eat during the day. Social and economic rights
generally address needs such as nutrition, housing and education. This discourse has often been
adopted by developing countries too. 5 The division into two categories meant that two different
treaties had to be written:  the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
In recent decades this distinction has faded, especially as far as the European Union is concerned
(Balducci 2008). However, studies have proven that the Union's institutions still prioritize civil and
4 Interview with President Prodi, (8 May 2015) over the phone.
5 Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
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political rights (Balducci 2008). This has been true, for example, in the context of the dialogue with
China, where the EU has repeatedly stressed its prioritization of those rights, while the East Asian
government clearly placed more importance on the economic and social ones (Kinzelbach 2014).
Cuba, similarly to China, has focussed on economic and social rights since it became part of the
Eastern bloc during the Cold War. Today, this preference is still reflected in the country's legislation
(Pachot 2010) and in how the government stresses the achievements of the Cuban Literacy
Campaign (The Independent 2010) and similar initiatives. It is important to realize, therefore, that
more attention needs to be paid to cultural norms, as they play a role in defining the norm “human
rights” as a whole (Passini 2011). 
2.5 Finding a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZoPA)
Understanding the cultural and historic differences in how human rights have developed is
particularly relevant to the EU promotion of human rights. As a matter of fact, there has been
confusion over which set of human rights is to be given priority on more than one dialogue with
third parties regarding this issue. Aside from the case of China, studied at length by Kinzelbach
(2014), there are other examples of how such confusion can create difficulties in negotiations.
Quevedo Flores (2009) highlights a similar case in recent negotiations with Brazil and other Latin
American countries. In that situation, certain clauses had to be included to specify which human
rights where being referred to (Quevedo Flores 2009). It is unlikely that the EU promotion of the
human rights norm will be successful if it is not clear what that norm actually is.
Confusion over this issue is also problematic from a negotiations perspective, as it limits the
possibility of finding a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZoPA), where the parties can conclude the
negotiation process in a way that is satisfactory for everyone. Wanis-St. John (2012) studies EU-
Iran negotiations and argues that the existence or non-existence of a ZoPA mostly depends on the
issue at stake. If the two parties are focussed on different issues (in this case, different sets of human
rights), no ZoPA will be possible. On the other hand, it is also important that negotiators are able to
determined where the ZoPA lies, if it exists, and this might not be possible if the issue at stake is
not clear (in this case, if it is not clear which human rights have priority).
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3. Research Design
3.1 Case selection
As mentioned above, norm entrepreneurs do not simply expect other countries to imitate the new
norm, as this is likely to clash with older ones already in place (Elgstrom 2000). The
institutionalization of a new norm often needs to go through a negotiation process before the new
countries are persuaded of its validity and actually adopt it (Elgstrom 2000). For this reason, it is
important that more research is focussed on negotiations as part of the norm socialization process,
and this is why a negotiation process is the case study of this thesis.
Countries that have a poor record of human rights are the ones most likely to be resistant to the
new norms that the EU is trying to promote. Their record is poor precisely because human rights are
not part of their culture and their institutions (yet), so when they negotiate with the EU they find
themselves confronting an actor trying to persuade them of new rules clashing with the ones they
have already in place. It will not be possible for them to accept these new rules unless they are
translated into policies that are considered acceptable for their own institutions first. Because human
rights are a core principle of all EU's external relations, they are bound to become key to any
negotiation with this group of countries, even when the focus technically is on other issues (e.g.
trade negotiations). 
Cuba has proven to be particularly resistant to norms coming from Western countries, including
EU member states. After the revolution in the 1950s, it belonged to the Eastern block until the Cold
War, and it has relied on China and on some Latin American partners since the fall of the Soviet
Union. It has endured a more than 50 years long embargo by the USA, and a look at Amnesty
International annual reports clearly shows that the human rights record of the Caribbean country has
not significantly improved in the last decades. 6 
Whereas many countries in the world are accused of not protecting human rights, few of them
have shown as much resistance to Western norms and institutions as Cuba has. As a matter of fact,
Gordy and Lee (2009) argue that the communist country poses an actual threat to the West in terms
of how human rights are perceived. By insisting that its view on the issue is different, Cuba, like
North Korea, directly challenges the universality of human rights (Gordy and Lee 2009). This is
bound to be problematic for the EU, that will likely face a great deal of resistance when trying to
carry out its process of norm socialization in relations with Cuba. 
6  Amnesty International annual reports on Cuba can be found at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/cuba
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EU relations with the Caribbean country have been difficult since the revolution, although
several countries made attempts at increasing cooperation with Cuba. 7 The EU is Cuba's second
largest trading partner (EU External Action Service 2014), but the Common Position on Cuba
issued in 1996, and still in place, makes it clear that the EU will not fully cooperate with Cuba until
its human rights record has improved (European Union Council 1996). As mentioned above,
however, it is unlikely that a norm such as human rights will simply be “imitated” by a country
where it is not considered a norm yet, and that is why negotiations are key to the process. This
research will therefore focus on negotiations with Cuba as a case study for a better understanding of
EU promotion of human rights. 
Through an analysis of this particularly complicated case, this thesis hopes to provide for a better
insight on the challenges faced by the EU when trying to promote human rights. The case study will
be divided into three different time periods, following relevant changes in the relationship between
Cuba and the EU. Hopefully this research will highlight what factors impact and perhaps facilitate
the task of promoting human rights outside the EU. 
Firstly, the thesis will look at the period when the Common Position was being developed and
issued (1992-1997). During this period, the EU's approach to Cuba was affected by the worsening
of US-Cuba relations, which led to the US strengthening the embargo through two different pieces
of legislation: the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the Helms-Burton law in 1995. The EU
Council therefore issued a Common Position, in 1996, that reflected the willingness to keep a hard
line against Castro's government, without completely closing opportunities for dialogue.
Secondly, the thesis will examine the period around the Cocktail Wars, going from 2002 to 2008.
Relations between the two parties were particularly strained in those years. Several dissidents were
jailed in Cuba, and the EU's response was to take diplomatic actions involving many representatives
of the opposition. In that period, the EU was undergoing the process of its first Eastern enlargement,
which included many post-Communist countries. As it has already been explained, the enlargement
is particularly relevant to the case of Cuba, because it involved the development of the Copenhagen
criteria, based on the respect for human rights, and the entrance to the EU of many countries that
shared with Cuba the experience of belonging to the Eastern bloc. 
Finally, the analysis will consider the period going from the end of the Cocktails Wars to
nowadays, when the EU and Cuba started building stronger and more open relations. In particular,
the thesis will look at two key events that characterised the beginning of this period: the transfer of
7 An example was the Netherlands during the administration of the Den Uyl government (Interview with Professor 
Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague).
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power from Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba and by the election of Obama in the USA. However, the
analysis will also have to take into account that the EEAS was established in 2010 and that, by then,
many Eastern countries had already become part of the EU and could influence its behaviour in
foreign policy. The purpose of this analysis is to understand whether all these factors were relevant
in the change of attitude of the EU towards Castro's government, and whether something has
changed in the shared understanding of the human rights norms between the two parties.
Not all the challenges that this research will reveal may be applicable to all other cases, but they
can provide for a worst-case scenario, against which other negotiations can be tested. They can also
help understanding what factors influence the possibility of a dialogue on human rights norms
between two parties. Knowing the difficulties the EU is facing in the process is a first step towards
learning how to overcome them, which may help making sure that the process of norm socialization
involving human rights works well in Cuba, but also in less challenging situations. In other words,
this research will help develop policies that may be useful for the promotion of human rights in a
number of cases where there is a resistance, on the other side, to the EU's discourse.
3.2 Research question
This thesis will try to answer the following question: how has the European Union (EU) treated
the issue of human rights in negotiations with Cuba since the issuance of its Common Position in
1996? As Balducci (2008) explains, the EU has actively engaged with the promotion of human
rights in developing countries since the beginning of the 1990s. He also argues that the EU's
behaviour on the matter has been influenced both by external and internal factors (Balducci 2008).
This research will therefore acknowledge that relations between the EU and Cuba have evolved in a
context where several actors and interests interact. In order to do this, a series of hypotheses
(outlined in the next section) will be tested.
3.3 Methodological Approach and Hypotheses
This research will take into account the division of human rights into two categories, evidenced
by the existence of two Covenants (the ICCPR and the ICESCR). This is particularly relevant to
this case study because the division into two categories developed during the Cold War, when Cuba
belonged to the Eastern block, which called into question the usefulness of political and civil rights
when the most basic material conditions (such as the right to housing or to a proper nutrition) could
not be provided (Klabbers 2013). This also partially relates to the challenge that Cuba poses to the
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universality of human rights, as understood by the West.
As mentioned above, the EU has come to pay much more attention to economic, social and
cultural rights, but studies have shown that the promotion of civil and political rights is still
prioritized (Balducci 2008). Moreover, Quevedo Flores (2009) argues that confusion over what
exactly constitutes a human rights breach led to the inclusion of certain clauses in agreements with
Brazil and other Latin American countries, that define which principles should be seen as essential.
This demonstrates that the question of which set of human rights should be given priority has not
been answered in a conclusive manner yet. A confusion similar to the one that arose in the contexts
examined by Quevedo Flores might be expected when the two sides of the negotiations table
prioritize different sets of principles, as it happens between the EU and Cuba. It is possible to
expect that this could be an important issue in negotiations with Cuba, one that might lead to
problems creating or even finding a possible ZoPA. 
Since this research is focussed on the EU promotion of human rights, the thesis will explore how
the institution has treated the division of the two sets of human rights. The expected finding is that
when the EU has criticized Cuba specifically on the grounds of its lack of protection for civil and
political rights, relations have been difficult. On the other hand, when the EU has avoided the focus
on this set of rights, relations have been more open. If this is the case, the EU will have found it
easier to promote the norm “human rights” when it has not focussed on a specific set of rights and
there was more opportunity for dialogue. Therefore, the thesis will explore the following
hypothesis:
H1 – When the EU has stressed the importance of civil and political rights,
relations with Cuba have been strained
On the other hand, it is important to analyse whether the different perspectives on human rights
have made it difficult for the two parties to find a possible ZoPA. It is likely that if the EU does not
explain clearly which rights it gives priority to, it will be impossible for the two parties to find a
ZoPA and, therefore, to start a constructive dialogue. This means that confusions over the
importance of the different sets of rights has made relations difficult and has therefore become an
obstacle to the EU's promotion of the norm. This is why this research will test the following
hypothesis:
17
Caterina Manzi MSc International Relations and Diplomacy Master Thesis
H2 – When the EU has not clarified explicitly which human rights should take
priority, relations between with Cuba have been strained
Since the EU issued its first Common Position on Cuba in 1996 (re-evaluated every six months),
the Castro government has rejected it and relations have been tense. An increase in this tension was
seen in 2002, when La Habana jailed 75 dissidents and the EU embassies responded by committing
to inviting dissidents to their national day celebrations. Subsequently, diplomatic relations froze and
it was only after several months that an agreement was found (Castle 2005). Interestingly, it was the
Spanish government that made the first move in that case, and it was the Spanish presidency of the
EU that tried to change the Common Position in 2010, albeit unsuccessfully (Lecarte 2014). 
Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003), as well as Balducci (2008) highlight the importance of
considering national interests when analysing EU's policies, especially in the international relations
sphere. For example, national interests were the driving force in EU-Iran nuclear negotiations
analysed by Wanis-St John (2012), whereby it was certain member states that initiated negotiations,
and they were later followed by the High Commissioner for the EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy. It is important to acknowledge, therefore, that the EU might not always act as a single norm
entrepreneur, but rather as a community of several norm entrepreneurs. If this were the case, more
work would be needed in order to understand whether member states themselves need an increased
socialization of the norm in question (human rights) so that they can act collectively, as this will
improve the promotion of human rights to third countries.
For these reasons the thesis look at changes in the behaviour of the EU towards Cuba under
different presidencies. The work will also examine the possible changes in the EU's approach
during different phases of its recent history. In particular, it is possible to expect that the Eastern
enlargement of the past decade has had an impact on the openness of the institution towards Cuba.
This is because the newest EU members were part of the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, as was
Cuba. Finally, the thesis hopes to get some insight on the behaviour of negotiators from different
countries during negotiations within the EU team through interviews with practitioners, in order to
test the third hypothesis:
H3 – National interests have a significant impact on the EU's attitude towards
Cuba
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Since the EU is Cuba's biggest foreign investor (Lecarte 2014), studying patterns of behaviour
following changes to the economic system in the Caribbean country might also give some insight
on the way negotiations are carried out and on whether the economic side has a link to the
promotion of human rights, as feared by Por Otra Cuba and Civil Rights Defenders (2014). It is
important to consider that the Cuban government is keen on highlighting that it is not carrying out
“reforms”, but rather “updates” to the economic model. 8 The research will be based on information
available on economic measures in Cuba during the last two decades in order to assess whether the
pattern of reform was reflected in a certain pattern of behaviour by the EU. In particular, it is
possible to expect to find that the transfer of power from Fidel to Raul Castro (considered more
economically liberal) in 2008 was seen as a positive move by the EU institutions. The Council
Conclusions drawn from the by-yearly review of the Common Position will also provide important
data to test this hypothesis.
H4 – Economic adaptations in Cuba have an impact on the EU's attitude towards
the country
Gratius (2011), however, argues that the economic role of the EU in Cuba is necessarily limited
by the US embargo. Given the close relationship that the EU has with the USA, it would be
interesting to analyse how changes in the behaviour of the latter impact the EU process of human
rights promotion in Cuba. It might be easier to work together with the USA as a pair of norm
entrepreneurs advocating the same perspective. The EU might therefore be trying to harmonize its
actions to those of its trans-atlantic partner. Pérez Milián (2008) makes an interesting suggestion
when she argues that the harsher stance taken by the EU during the Cocktail Wars was also a
consequence of the difficulties created by the Iraqi war, which had pulled the EU and the USA
further apart. The attitude towards Cuba, in Pérez Milián's point of view, was an attempt made by
the EU to get closer to the USA again (2008). In any case, it is important to understand what effect
the USA have on the EU-Cuba relationship in order to understand whether they constitute a
facilitating factor or an obstacle.
In order to test this hypothesis, the research will be based on a comparison between available
information on the relationship between the USA and Cuba and the pieces of information already
gathered (during the testing of other hypotheses) on the relationship between the EU and the
8 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels and interview with an official from the European 
Commission's Department of Trade, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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Communist country. The work will also look at how the EU institutions mention the US in their
documents, and at how EU officials view the impact of the Cuba-US relationship. Similar to the
case of national interests in the EU, different parties in the USA have different interests in Cuba.
The Republican party has historically enjoyed the support of the Cuban diaspora within the country,
which lobbies for the continuation of the embargo (Bishin and Klofstad 2012). The main problem
expected with this hypothesis is that the most relevant event that might have influenced the way the
USA behaves towards Cuba is the election of Barack Obama in 2009, just a few months after power
in the island was passed to Raul. It will therefore be difficult to distinguish what is a consequences
of one event or the other. Having acknowledged this issue, the thesis hopes to be able to test the
following hypothesis:
H5 – Periods of particular distension or tension in the USA-Cuba relations reflect
in the openness the EU shows towards the Caribbean country
The research will therefore develop around five independent variables: the focus on civil and
political rights; the confusion over which rights should be prioritized; national interests within the
EU; economic adaptations in Cuba; the US-Cuba relationship. The dependent variable for the first
two hypotheses is the quality of the relationship between the EU and Cuba, whereas the dependent
variable for the last set of hypotheses is the EU's openness towards the Caribbean country (which is
also a determining factor of the quality of the relationship). Understanding which of these factors
(the independent variables) mostly influences the dependent variables will help answering the
research question, by providing insight on how the EU can improve its relations with third countries
and therefore make its promotion of human rights more effective.
3.4 Data collection and analysis
As far as data collection is concerned, it is important to consider a number of possible difficulties
in the process of research information on negotiations. As Dur and Mateo (2010) describe,
gathering this type of data can prove to be extremely challenging. Asking negotiators directly seems
to be one of the best approaches, but suffers from three main flaws: the availability of practitioners,
the possibility that they might not be always sincere in their answers (Dur and Mateo 2010) and the
possible secrecy of negotiations, which would prevent them from sharing certain pieces of
information. Therefore, a mixed approach, where interviews are complemented (and cross-checked)
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by existing documentation is likely to give better, and more complete, results. However, once again,
the possible secrecy of, at least, certain parts of the negotiation process (such as private
conversations) might be an obstacle. Moreover, official documents do not take into account the
great deal of informal moments that form a negotiation process. 
All these difficulties have to be taken into account, but luckily the EU carries out a policy of
transparency, and therefore makes several documents available to the public (online, at the EUR-
Lex website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html). Therefore, this research adopts a mostly
qualitative methodology, based on a mixed approach that combines the empirical gathering of
information from both primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with the practitioners
involved. As far as primary resources are concerned, the research starts with an analysis of the 1996
Common Position on Cuba and of later Conclusions drawn from the bi-yearly re-evaluation of the
Common Position. Furthermore, European Parliament Resolutions on aspects of the relation with
Cuba, such as the 2010 one on prisoners of conscience, were also of great interest, as were other
similar documents (e.g. written questions to the Council).
These primary sources were particularly important to test H3, H4 and H5, when cross-referenced
to the information available on the historical situation, mostly coming from secondary sources. As
far as H3 is concerned, the experience of people directly involved in intra-EU negotiations was
particularly relevant. Similarly, the analysis of the Conclusions written in the context of the by-
yearly evaluations of the Common position and the documents drafted by the EU Presidency also
gave important insights into the impact national interests have on Cuba-EU relations 
I have tried to get in touch with former negotiators in particular, because it is likely that those
people negotiating now will have more difficulties sharing secret information, but this was not
possible (apart from the case of Professor Pronk, who negotiated with Cuba in a bilateral format in
the 1970s). However, EU officials presently working on negotiations were extremely open and
provided all the information needed for this work. It has therefore been possible to conduct
extensive and extremely interesting interviews with officials from the EEAS, the Commission and
the EU Delegation in la Habana. These interviews have helped a great deal in the testing of all
hypotheses throughout all the three time periods of analysis, although they were most helpful when
researching the latest period of negotiations.
Testing H5 was done mostly through the gathering of information on the USA-Cuba relationship
on secondary sources, including news articles, and then relating those pieces of information to what
had already been gathered on the negotiations between the EU and Cuba, in order to assess whether
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there are similar patterns of behaviour. The issue was also probed in the interviews with
practitioners of the EU team, through questions aimed at understanding whether negotiators were
told to change their behaviour after certain events characterizing the USA-Cuba relation, or if they
experienced a change in how negotiations were conducted after the election of Obama. Similarly,
the question of economic reforms in the islands was also probed during interviews with
practitioners. For H4, secondary sources (mostly news articles) were also referenced in order to
understand what the perceived advantages and disadvantages (for the EU) were in relation to the
economic measures, and in particular to those introduced by Raul Castro.
As far as the first set of hypotheses (H1 and H2) is concerned,the Institute of International
Relations in La Habana was extremely helpful in making available some official documents on the
matter. However, direct contact with people involved in the process was particularly helpful for
these hypothesis, as it made it easier to understand whether a possible ZoPA was identified, and
how (or why not). The interviews with negotiators of the EEAS involved, both in Brussels and in la
Habana were extremely helpful, and the thesis could have greatly benefited from information from
the Cuban embassy in Brussels, but an interview was not possible at the time the research was
conducted. 
Finally, reports written by Cuban civil society organizations operating outside the country were
also relevant to the research, as they tend to highlight the direction of the process of norm
socialization. Even though these organizations arguably have little saying in the building of Cuban
institutions at the moment, their close ties with the country's community mean that they have a
deeper understanding of whether a norm such as human rights is in the process of being accepted by
Cubans. Their reports are available online, an example being the afore-mentioned report by Por
Otra Cuba and Civil Rights Defenders (2014).
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4. The Common Position
4.1 The historical context
As an EEAS official explained during an interview, the EU discourse around Cuba that led to the
issuance of the Common Position was rooted in a particularly important period for the Communist
government. 9 The Berlin Wall had come down and the Eastern bloc had disappeared, which meant
that the US had become the only hegemonic power left in the world. Until then, Cuba had relied
heavily on the support of the Soviet Union, as even the countries geographically closer (namely
Latin America and the Caribbean) had chosen to side with the USA.
At the same time, however, the Castro government started exploring options for support outside
the traditional Eastern bloc towards the end of the 1980s. Aside from getting nearer to China and
some Caribbean and Latin American countries, it also made an incredible effort to fit international
institutions that were not dominated by its Northern neighbour, while, at the same time, it started
openly calling for an end to the embargo (Dominguez 2001). Moreover, it declared that it would
stop arming rebels in other countries, which was an important issue for many EU countries
(Dominguez 2001).
With the Cold war ended and Cuba visibly trying to reach out to the rest of the world, the moves
by the US to try and strengthen the embargo started to look increasingly outdated to other countries,
including the European ones. Moreover, many countries' economies were negatively affected by the
embargo (Dominguez 2001), and were even more negatively affected by the Torricelli Law in 1992
and by the Helms-Burton Act in 1995, which, among its provision, would allow the US to ask for
compensation to EU companies that had business in Cuba, with the consequence that it would
“discourage companies from third countries from trading with Cuba” (European Commission 1995,
ch 3 par. a).
While the US was passing new legislation to further isolate the Communist government,
therefore, the EU started exploring its options and, as a matter of fact, it seemed to consider itself as
fundamental to link Cuba back to the international community:
“it is clear that the European Parliament believes that a successful, peaceful
transition to a market economy and political pluralism in Cuba will require the
active support of the European Union to help bind the island republic back into
9 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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the international community.”
(European Commission 1995, ch 2, par. c)
4.2 The condemnation of the embargo
The documents drafted in the years preceding the publishing of the Common Position show that
the EU took a clear stance against the embargo, and in particular against the recently issued
Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts. Evidence of the condemnation of the embargo can be found in
several documents drafted by the European Parliament:
“recognizing the effects of the economic and financial blockade, unilaterally
maintained for 33 years by the United States, although the Torricelli Act is
contrary to international law and has been rejected by the international
community” 
(European Parliament 1994, preamble A) 
“taking note of the fact that the economic and financial embargo of Cuba by the
United States for the past 34 years, not forgetting the attempted invasion, has not
achieved its objective of forcing change and believing that attempts to isolate and
strengthen the boycott, though affecting standards of life adversely, will hinder
rather than hasten reforms”
(Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995, preamble J)
“Many experts take the view that the embargo is anachronistic now that the
Cold War is over, and is also counterproductive, since it has an adverse impact on
the Cuban people and legitimizes their leaders' temptation to resist change.”
(Economic and Social Committee 1996, par. 6.1.5)
A clear explanation of the reasons behind this condemnation is offered by the European
Commission, in its 1995 report on Relations between the EU and Cuba. Lifting the trade embargo,
the Report explains, would encourage contact between the US and the Communist government,
which would, in turn, facilitate the democratic transition envisioned by the EU (European
Commission 1995). Instead, the Commission believed that the embargo was “blocking the Cuban
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reform process” (European Commission 1995, par. 3.a). The EU was convinced that the best way to
help bring about reform in Cuba was dialogue, not strong economic measures cutting the country
out of the international system.
The deterioration of the relationship between the US and Cuba, therefore, does not seem to have
had an impact on the EU's approach to the island in the years preceding the Common Position. In
other words, H5 does not seem to be confirmed for the first period analysed. The EU's openness
towards Cuba was not negatively affected by the USA's attitude.
However, it is important to consider that there might be a difference in the attitudes of the main
EU institutions involved. The reports mentioned above are all from either the Commission or the
Parliament but the Common Position itself, adopted by the Council, takes a different stance and
could have been more influenced by the USA's policy, as explained by an EEAS official. 10 This
would point to the Council being more easily influenced by the developments in the US-Cuba
relations. 11At the same time, the Common Position contains a veiled criticism of the embargo as
well, when it is stated that “[i]t is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by
coercive measures with the effect of increasing the economic hardship of the Cuban people”
(European Union Council 1996, art.1). Even considering intra-EU differences, therefore, it is still
possible to assert that  the overall attitude of the EU towards Cuba was markedly different than that
of the US between 1994 and 1997.
4.3 Economic ties between the EU and Cuba
As mentioned above, many EU member states were negatively affected by the US embargo on
Cuba (Dominguez 2001). Reports drafted by both the Commission and the Parliament, as a matter
of fact, evidence that many European countries had developed bilateral economic ties with the
Caribbean island, especially in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War (European
Commission 1995, par. 2.d; Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995, preamble P; Economic and Social
Committee, par. 8.1). Many EU countries, therefore, clearly had relevant economic interests in the
island, and the EU as a whole saw a potential for its own economic growth that was not being taken
advantage of (Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995).
The way economic reform in Cuba is presented in the 1995 Commission report shows that it had
an impact in the will to start talks for a strengthening of relations with Cuba (European Commission
10 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
11 The Commission briefly illustrates the different roles and attitudes of the EU institutions in chapter 2 of its 1995 
report.
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1995). As a matter of fact, annex A of the report is a list of the main economic reforms enacted by
the Castro government since the end of the Cold War, which evidences the great importance placed
on such measures (European Commission 1995). The Common Position also acknowledges that the
EU's attitude towards Cuba is strongly linked to the increase in openness of the Cuban economy
(Common Position 1996, art. 2). During this historical period, therefore, the variable “economic
adaptations in Cuba” from H4 seems to have had a significant impact on EU-Cuba relations. 
4.4 Human rights
While debating the possibilities for improved relations with Cuba, the EU recognized that the
economic transition in the country could not happen at the expense of the Communist government's
achievements in terms of education, health care, employment and other relevant areas (Committee
on Foreign Affairs 1995). In other words, the EU seemed to recognize the importance of economic
and social rights, and the steps the Cuban government had taken in order to guarantee their
protection. From the EU side, therefore, there was a deep understanding of which rights Cuba gave
priority to and an agreement on the importance of such rights.
It is also important to notice that the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs makes
reference to specific rights that are already given priority to in the island: “racial equality, the rights
of women, the high level of literacy, the establishment of a publicly provided health service, low
infant mortality and high life expectancy”. (Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995, Preamble D)
Moreover, the Committee makes specific reference to which rights need to be given more attention
in Cuba, such as “the lack of educational pluralism, freedom to teach and freedom of expression”
(Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995, Preamble D). Both the European Parliament and the
Commission also placed great importance to the issue of political prisoners (Committee on Foreign
Affairs 1995; European Commission 1995). As these examples show, there seemed to be great
clarity from the EU side as to which specific rights needed particular attention over the whole
period analysed, meaning that H2 is not confirmed. As a matter of fact, there does not seem to be a
correlation between the clarity made by EU institutions over the importance of the different sets of
rights and the openness of the relationship.
It seems like the EU stressed the need to strengthen the protection of civil and political rights,
while also acknowledging the importance of social and economic rights. In other words, it did not
give priority to one set of rights over the other, but it viewed a division in the way civil and political
rights are treated in the island, in comparison with social and economic ones, and it expressed that
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in its reports. The results of this analysis, therefore, show that H1 was confirmed during this period,
since when there was no particular focus on civil and particular rights on the part of the EU
reflected on a period of relative distension between the two parties.
As mentioned earlier, an understanding of the needs of the parties is vital to a communication-
based approach to international relations. As a matter of fact, great importance was given by the
European Parliament to the Cuban authorities' fear that a transition to a free-market economy would
lead to higher rates of unemployment in the country (see Economic and Social Committee 1995),
which points to an attempt made by the EU to listen to the needs of the other side. However, it is
also important to note that the EU discourse on human rights during this period was strongly tied
with the discourse on democratic reform. Most importantly, it was tied with an apparently active
effort by the EU to promote internal political reform. This is particularly true in the case of the
Common Position, which explicitly states:
“In order to facilitate peaceful change in Cuba, the European Union
( a) will intensify the present dialogue with the Cuban authorities and with all
sectors of Cuban society in order to promote respect for human rights and real
progress towards pluralist democracy”
(Common Position 1995, art. 3)
As explained by an official of the EEAS, this was the main obstacle to the improvement in
relations with Cuba, which in effect only took place much later. 12 Cuba strongly opposes
international interference with internal affairs. This could be seen as a need that was not properly
heard and addressed by the EU in the period analysed here, which might have had a negative effect
on the search for a ZoPA. Once again, the European Parliament showed a different attitude than the
Council, and seemed to understand the needs of the Cuban government better. 13 This issue will be
explored further in the next section. 
4.5 Intra-EU negotiations
The 1995 report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs states:
12 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
13 As an example of this acknowledgement on the part of the European Parliament, please refer to the repeated use of 
the phrase “with due respect for the sovereignty of the Cuban people” or similar in report by the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs
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“The Committee on Development and Cooperation regrets that Parliament's
views have not been taken into account by the Council since, when the report is
adopted in plenary, the Troika group will already have submitted it, for which
reason it calls for the conclusions to be dispatched immediately and wishes to be
involved in whatever measures are adopted as a result of those conclusions”
(Committee on Foreign Affairs 1995, Conclusions, par. 9)
This statement seems to confirm the idea that there might have been differences among the EU
institutions. Another evidence of these differences are the written questions submitted by members
of Parliament to the Commission and to the Council. MEP Thomas Megahy, for example, asked the
Commission why Commissioner Marin had raised the issue of reforming the penal code to Castro in
a meeting that was supposed to be about economic reform, and whether the same issue would be
raised with other countries, for example of the People's Republic of China (Megahy 1996). MEP
Alonso raised a similar question to the Council, as he asked whether pieces of legislation similar to
the Common Position were going to be issued in relations to other countries that have a poor human
rights record (Alonso 1997a).
On the other hand, the research has not highlighted particularly relevant differences in attitudes
between EU member states during this period, which would mean that H3 is not confirmed.
However, an official from the EEAS mentioned during an interview that it was the Spanish
presidency which pushed for the adoption of the Common Position, 14 something highlighted by the
analysis of Pérez Milián (2008) too. The official from the EEAS, on the other hand, also explained
that Spain's attitude towards the Cuban government generally used to depend on which party was in
power in the country. It would therefore be difficult to attribute the Common Position to an
expression of a national interest per se, but rather an expression of party interests. 
In 1997 it was clear that the political dialogue with Cuba was to be halted. The Common
Position had linked it to progress on the human rights front and to political reform in the country,
which went against the needs and interests of the Communist government. This is evidenced by the
answer to the question of MEP Alonso to the Commission in 1997, on whether a dialogue with
Cuban authorities could be initiated (Alonso 1997b). The Commission answered that the Common
Position was making it impossible to start such dialogue. In other words, at that point, it was out of
the hands of either the Commission or the Parliament.
14 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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5. The Cocktail Wars
5.1 A strained relationship
Not much progress was made in the dialogue between the EU and Cuba in the years following
the Common Position. The Council evaluated its decision every six months, but never decided to
change it. As a matter of fact, the EU criticized Cuba's human rights record on several occasions
during those years and relations were consequently strained (EurActiv.com 2001). The answer
given by the Council to MEP Sánchez García in 2000 precisely highlights the fact that the EU-Cuba
relationship had seen no substantial changes in those years (Sánchez García and Council of the
European Union 2000).
However, it is also important to note that, until 2003, dialogue was never completely closed, as
efforts were made on both sides to improve the situation, to the point that an EU official delegation
to Cuba was opened in 2003 (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 2003). In particular, the
Belgian leadership seemed to try and push for the EU to start structured negotiations with the Cuban
government. This is evidenced by the fact that it was Belgium's Foreign Minister leading the 2001
delegation to la Habana (EurActiv.com 2001) and by the answer given to MEPs Maij-Weggen and
Deva by the Commission in 2002 (European Commission 2002), which attributes the re-launching
of the political dialogue with Cuba to the Belgian presidency of the EU. As the next section will
show, the role of national interests seems to be an important factor in determining the EU's
behaviour in those years.
The relationship deteriorated when a number of journalists and dissidents were jailed in Cuba in
2002. Documents from all European institutions show that the EU was watching closely the
situation (European Commission 2002, Presidency of the European Union 2003, European
Parliament 2004, European Union Council 2004). These events led to several measures and
sanctions being imposed by the EU on the Cuban government. In its Declaration on behalf of the
European Union, the Presidency stated that: 
“Furthermore and vis-à-vis the current situation in Cuba, the EU has
unanimously decided to:
- limit the bilateral high-level governmental visits
- reduce the profile of member states' participation in cultural events
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- invite Cuban dissidents at national days celebrations
- proceed to the re-evaluation of the EU common position”
(Presidency of the European Union 2003)
Gibbs deems the decision of European states to start inviting dissidents to their national days
celebrations as the one that most “infuriated the Cuban government”, and for this reason this
historical period in EU-Cuba relations has been called “the cocktail wars” (Gibbs 2003). 
5.2 The role of the Spanish government
As mentioned above, the Belgian leadership of the EU was characterized by an attempt to open a
dialogue with Cuba, but things deteriorated afterwards. Pérez Milián (2008) highlights the role
played by Spanish Prime Minister Aznar throughout the whole period going from the issuing of the
Common Position to the Cotonou agreements with the Caribbean countries in 2000 (when, in the
author's point of view, Spain and the UK pushed for the introduction of specific clauses for Cuba).
Most importantly, the author also argues that Prime Minister Aznar was responsible for the new
sanctions imposed on Castro's government in 2002, when Spain held the EU presidency once again,
following the Belgian one. Similarly, Lamrani, a French academic whose work focusses mostly on
Cuba, also attributes the political and diplomatic sanctions on Castro's government to the Aznar's
presidency (Lamrani 2007). 
At the same time, Spain was also the first country that normalized relations with Cuba (Gibbs
2005). As a matter of fact, it was the Spanish Foreign Minister who asked for the policy of inviting
dissidents to the embassies to be dropped (Castle 2005). Whereas the suggestion to drop the
“Cocktail War” was taken on by the EU in the end, not all countries agreed that normalizing
relations with Castro's government was the best option (Castle 2005). 15 As a matter of fact, former
Communist countries, and in particular the Czech Republic, were keen on keeping a hard line
towards Cuba, even when Spain was ready to open up, an issue that will be explored in the next
section.
5.3 The Eastern enlargement
Ten countries entered the EU in 2004, most of them belonging to the former Communist bloc.
These countries had a shared history with Cuba, because they were on the same side of the Cold
15 It does not seem surprising that Pérez Milián (2008) sargues there was a high degree of political fragmentation 
inside the EU in those years. 
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War, but had taken an extremely different path after the Soviet Union was dismantled. As an
official from the EU Delegation in La Habana confirmed, it is possible to imagine that these
countries were particularly keen on not granting many concessions to a Communist government,
and that this resulted in a harsher stance from the EU on the issue of human rights. 16 As a matter of
fact, Castle reports that Czech politicians drew direct parallels between the situation of their country
during the Cold War and that of Cuba (Castle 2005). It seems, therefore, that the perspective of the
Eastern countries might have played a big role in the EU's behaviour towards Cuba and, in
particular, towards the issue of human rights in those years. This, together with the role played by
the Belgian and the Spanish governments and by the political fragmentation seen in those years
(and recounted by Pérez Milián), seems to confirm H3.
The Eastern enlargement, however, was also important because of the internal work on human
rights that it required within the EU. The development of the Copenhagen criteria radically changed
the relationship between the EU and any country that it wished to negotiate with, and not only with
prospective member states. As a matter of fact, the enlargement was, in a way, an instrument for the
expansion of the role of human rights in the EU 17 From that moment onwards, human rights
became a fundamental premise to any negotiation. 18 Since new countries are joining or are hoping
to join the EU in future, it is particularly important to acknowledge how internal changes to the
structure of the EU influence the promotion of human rights.
5.4 A relationship between human rights and the choice of an economic system?
There are two other factors that seem to be important to understand the EU's promotion of
human rights in Cuba during this period: economic interests and the relationship with the US. As far
as the former is concerned, Pérez Milián (2008) argues that human rights were used as an excuse to
push for a capitalistic system. As a matter of fact, she views the EU's criticism of the Helms-Burton
law as intimately connected to the negative effects the legislation had on its economic interests
(Pérez Milián 2008). In this context, it is interesting to note that a number of documents issued by
the EU institutions in those years stress the need for economic reform in the Caribbean country.
“The European Parliament
16 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
17 Interview with President Prodi, (8 May 2015) over the phone.
18 Interview with President Prodi, (8 May 2015) over the phone.
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[…] Regrets the lack of economic and social reforms, which is making the
daily lives of Cuban citizens harder”
(European Union Parliament 2004, par. 10)
“The Council expressed regret at the imposition of new restrictions on private
enterprise since the last evaluation, with negative consequences for many Cuban
people. It repeated its view that the opening of the Cuban economy would benefit
all its people”
(European Union Council 2004)
“The European Union believes that the lifting of the US trade embargo would
open Cuba's economy to the benefit of the Cuban people. The European Union
also urges the Cuban government to bring about change in the economic field,
particularly by lifting restrictions on private enterprise.”
(European Union Presidency 2005)
These extracts are parts of larger documents generally focussed on the lack of respect for human
rights in the island. It is therefore difficult to argue that the EU's economic interests were more
important than the promotion of human rights. However, it seems clear that there was a connection
between the two in this period and that the lack of economic reform in the Cuban system was one of
the factors that pushed the EU to take a hard stance towards the Communist government, which
confirms H4.
As far as the relationship with the US is concerned, Pérez Milián (2008) interestingly argues that
the EU's attitude against Cuba is not necessarily a consequence of the attitude of the US, even if it
follows similar patterns. The findings of this research point to a similar conclusion: whenever EU
institutions mention the US policies against Cuba, they do so in order to criticize the illegality of the
embargo. Moreover, all the documents analysed tend to stress the fact that the EU does not share
the view that avoiding dialogue, as the US was doing, is the best way to promote the respect for
human rights. The period of the Cocktail Wars was not characterised by particular moments of
tension between the USA and Cuba. Furthermore, there seems to be no evidence to support Pérez
Milián's (2008) claim that the EU's attitude towards Cuba might be linked to the Iraqi war and to a
willingness by the EU to mend issues in the relationship with its North American partner. For these
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reasons, H5 does not seem to be confirmed for this time period. However, it is also important to
acknowledge that there might have been a link between the way the attitude of certain member
states and their willingness to not ruin their bilateral relation with the US, as it had happened in the
years of the Cold War. 19
5.5 Finding a ZoPA
Despite numerous attempts, it is clear that it was impossible during those years to find enough
common ground to start an actual political dialogue. As a matter of fact, relations deteriorated to the
point that diplomatic ties were officially broken for a couple of years. This incapacity to start a
constructive dialogue gave no positive results in terms of human rights protection. It is impossible,
however, to attribute these difficulties to a confusion over which rights should be prioritized. The
focus of the disagreement in those years was on how the EU saw the treatment of dissidents in the
island (a matter of political and civil rights), meaning that H1 is confirmed for this time period. 
At the same time, the analysis by Pérez Milián (2008) highlights that Cuba viewed this as an
excuse to cover up the EU's interest in changing the country's economic interest. Whereas this does
not necessarily mean that Castro's government was trying to shift the focus to social and economic
rights, it evidences a difference in perspectives by the two parties. H2 is not confirmed by this
research, as the EU was very clear on which specific rights were important during this period of
tense relations. Nevertheless, the importance given by the EU to civil and political rights and the
fear by Cuba that this was being used as an excuse for a push towards a capitalistic system meant
that the two parties were not able to find any ZoPA.
19 Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
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6. The road to negotiations
Although economic and political measures against the Cuban government were suspended in
2005 (Castle 2005), relations between the country and the EU did not improve significantly in the
following years. The European Parliament wrote, in 2007:
“The European Parliament
[...]
2. Regrets the absence of any significant signs on the part of the Cuban
authorities in response to the EU's calls for full respect for fundamental freedoms,
especially freedom of expression and political association;
3. Regrets the failure to respond to the call of Parliament and the Council for
the immediate release of all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, and
insists that imprisoning Cuban dissidents for their ideals and their peaceful
political activity is contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”
(European Parliament 2007)
Relations began changing in 2008, when a memorandum of understanding was signed between
the two parties and when the Commission started considering the development of a negotiation
mandate. 20 As will be explained in the following section, this led to the beginning of the ongoing
negotiation process in 2014. 
Whereas it is difficult to pinpoint the exact events that led to the improvement of relations, the
next section will analyse two important factors: the election of Obama in the USA and the transfer
of power from Fidel to Raul Castro in Cuba. As it will be explained later, both these events are
strictly connected to the last hypotheses of this research (H4 and H5). In order to test the remaining
hypotheses, then, the creation of the EEAS in 2010 and the way EU institutions and Member States
national interests have interacted on the issue of Cuba in recent years will be examined.
6.1 The relationship with the US
As mentioned earlier, the Cuban diaspora in the USA generally tends to vote for the Republican
party, which has historically granted them more support for the embargo (Hayden 2015). When
20 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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Obama was elected, in 2008, this happened with a large support from the young Cubans living in
the country, and especially in Florida (until then, a stronghold of the Cuban lobbies) (Hayden 2015).
Whereas Republican Presidents have always taken a hard stance on Cuba, Democrats have taken
different approaches, even though none of them effectively managed to ease relations with the
Communist government. Obama behaved accordingly and did not show any relevant sign of
rapprochement until very recently, therefore making it difficult to argue that his election was key to
the EU's change in attitude towards Cuba. H5 cannot, therefore, be confirmed.
As a matter of fact, all the officials from the EU confirmed that the relationship between the US
and Cuba has not influenced the EU's approach to the country in recent years. 21 Indeed, the recent
opening of the US towards Castro's government, comes years after the EU started discussing the
possibility of a structured dialogue. As an official from the EEAS explained, the EU is a long way
ahead of the USA in terms of building trust with the Cuban government. 22
Similarly, answers given by both the Council and the Commission to MEPs' questions highlight
that both institutions distanced themselves from the US continued attempt at isolating Cuba. As a
matter of fact, through their answers, they align themselves with the Member States' decision to
support a UN resolution condemning the embargo, which has been presented every year since 1991
(Meyer and European Commission 2010; Meyer and EU Council 2011). It is also significant that
the Council, in its 2009 Conclusions on Evaluation of the EU Common Position on Cuba, notes
how the OAS had recently decided to open possibility of membership to the Communist
government (European Union Council 2009), a move that went against a USA veto imposed in
1962 (Hufbauer 2011).
6.2 The transfer of power in Cuba
As already mentioned above, another important event characterising the beginning of the latest
period in EU-Cuba relations was the transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul, who
officially took the role of President of the Council of State in 2008 (Mesa-Lago 2008). This move
was met with high expectations that the new President would be more liberal on the economic front
(Sullivan 2008). As a matter of fact, the government led by Raul Castro has adopted several
measures to “update” 23 the economic system, such as the expansion of the private sector and the
widening of possibilities for self-employment (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2013). This new period
21 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels and interview with an official from the European 
Commission's Department of Trade, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
22 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
23 See the research methodology chapter for an explanation of why the term “update” is used instead of “reform”.
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in Cuban political history that Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López call a “pragmatist period” coincides
with the decisions by the EU to open negotiations, which seems to confirm H4. Indeed, officials
from the EEAS agreed that the 2008 transfer of power and beginning of reforms might have had an
impact on the EU's decision to re-open formal negotiations. 24
However, it is also important to notice that an interview with a practitioner from the
Commission's Trade department revealed that there is a perception that no significant measure has
actually been taken in recent years. 25 When discussing the issue further, the same official also
expressed some frustration at the slow pace of the preparatory work for the Trade chapter of
negotiations. As an official from the EU Delegation explained, Cuban negotiators are seen as
extremely prepared on political issues, but not on economic ones. 26 Whereas the political dialogue
is coming to an end, the trade chapter has not formally started yet and this, according to the official
in the Delegation, is to be attributed mostly to the high expectations of the Cuban government. 27
The same official also expressed the willingness of the EEAS to help Cuba build capacity in the
trade field, 28 which means that the perceived lack of relevant economic measures does not reflect in
a particular attitude of closeness by the EU. 
In this case, it is therefore important to distinguish between the negotiation mandate and the
actual work at the negotiating table. The transfer of power to Raul (and the hopes of economic
update measures this move carried) was a contributing factor in the increased openness of EU
institutions towards the the Cuban government, but the adoption (or non-adoption) of actual
measures does not change the openness of EU negotiators towards the other party. The next section
will discuss how different institutions and national interests have interacted in the negotiation
process involving Cuba, in order to highlight other factors influencing the EU's recent attitude
towards the country.
24 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels, and interview with an official from the EU 
Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
25 Interview with an official from the European Commission's Department of Trade, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
26 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
27 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
28 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
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7. EU Institutions
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU's international relations are guided by the EEAS, responsible
for ensuring the functioning of the EU Delegations around the world and the cooperation of
member states in matters of foreign relations. 29 It is important to remember, however, that the
EEAS is a relatively new institution, as it was only established in 2010. Its work is closely linked to
that of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Foreign Affairs, as both institutions still
retain a certain degree of power in decisions regarding the EU's external relations. Moreover, the
EEAS has to share the power of representing the EU internationally with its member states (Wessel
and Van Vooren 2013). Not surprisingly, this division of responsibilities within the EU is not
always clear-cut, and Mrs Mogherini, the High Representative of the Union of Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, 30 recently referred to this issue in a lecture at the University of Leiden, where she
argued that it is time the EU found a unified voice in international settings (Mogherini 2015). This
has an impact on relation with Cuba since, as explained by an official in the EU Delegation in la
Habana, the government seems to have difficulties understanding how EU institutions work and
interact at times. 31 This chapter will briefly analyse how EU institutions interact on the issue of
foreign affairs, before making specific reference to the process of negotiations with Cuba.
7.1 The European External Action Service and the EU Foreign Affairs Council
As mentioned above, the EEAS is tasked with coordinating the external affairs of the EU and
coordinating the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 32 It is headed by the High Representative,
who is also the Vice-President of the Commission. In terms of negotiations, it holds the right of
initiative, and it is the main body participating in the negotiation process, through its officials based
in the different divisions or in the Delegations around the world. Among the divisions that compose
the EEAS, there is the Global and Multilateral Issues one, which comprises a Human Rights
department.
 However, it is important to consider also that the EU Foreign Affairs Council still retains a
certain degree of power in coordinating the EU's external relations. As far as relations with Cuba
are concerned, it is the body that issued the Common Position in 1996 and that reviews it every six
months. In general, the Council plays a key role in adopting measures to regulate the EU's external
29 For more information, see the EAS's website http://www.eeas.europa.eu
30 From here onwards, she will be referred to simply as the High Representative
31 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
32 For more information, see the EAS's website http://www.eeas.europa.eu
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relations, such as sanctions, and giving negotiating directives to the Commission. 33 As a matter of
fact, it collaborates closely with the EEAS, since the High Representative also chairs its meetings.
Generally, the Commission draws a proposal to start negotiations with a certain country or on a
certain issue, and the Council reviews it (and modifies it, if necessary), before eventually adopting
it. Once the proposal has been adopted, it becomes the negotiations' mandate for the Commission.
The next sections will explain how this process worked in the case of Cuba, after having briefly
analysed the role of the European Parliament (EP). 
7.2 The  European Parliament
As far as the role of the European Parliament is concerned, it is important to acknowledge that
the EEAS is financially accountable to the EP. As a matter of fact, the EP's Committee on Foreign
Affairs decides on the allocation of funds in order to promote the EU's interests around the world.
The approval of the Committee on Foreign Affairs is also needed for any international agreement.
Furthermore, the EP enacts a policy of parliamentary diplomacy, involving the parliaments of other
countries in order to strengthen the EU's international relations. 34 Not surprisingly, therefore, the
EP has played a key role in relations with Cuba and has issued several Resolutions on the matter,
that are necessarily taken into account by the EEAS and that have been of great interest for this
research.
However, during an interview with an official from the EEAS, it became clear that the EP is not
directly involved in negotiations with other countries until the agreement is finalized. At that point,
the EP has a role of consent, meaning it can either approve or reject the final text of the
negotiations. 35 On the other hand, during a negotiation process, there is close consultation between
the EEAS and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, often in a restricted form (generally involving
only the Chair of the Committee), so that the views of the Parliament can also be taken into account.
36 Therefore, whereas the EP officially has only a role of consent at the end of the process, there is
constant dialogue between the institutions, in order to avoid the whole process being wasted at the
end.
7.3 Starting negotiations with Cuba
33 For more information, see the Foreign Affairs Council's website http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/configurations/fac/
34 For more information, see the website of the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/home.html
35 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
36 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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In the case of Cuba, the EEAS prepared its negotiation mandate and discussed it with all other
Commission services involved. Once representatives of the other Commission departments had
provided their input, the mandate was then transferred to the Foreign Affairs Council. 37 There, the
text was debated by the working group on Latin America, mostly composed of members of the
permanent representations to the EU. 38 It took ten meetings of the working group before a text was
finally agreed upon. This is particularly interesting because, as an official of the EEAS explained, it
often takes only two or three meetings of the working group to agree on a negotiation mandate. The
case of Cuba, therefore, was particularly controversial and, as matter of fact, has often been high on
the agenda of the working group. 39 For this reason, while the Council had adopted the
Commission's recommendation in April 2013, an agreement on the text was finally reached only in
February 2014. 
As confirmed by the officials interviewed, there is no common front line of former Communist
countries on the case of human rights in Cuba at the moment. 40 However, there are different
perspectives, as the countries that are keener on taking a harsh stance against Castro's government
are Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and – up to a certain extent – Sweden. 41 Whereas the
latter three countries are seeing some significant changes in how human rights are treated in the
island, Germany tends to still be very strict on the issue. 42 These tend to be the countries with the
highest involvement of civil society in politics. 43 These different perspectives were the main reason
why the process of issuing a negotiation mandate took so long, therefore confirming the validity of
H3. It is also interesting to note that an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana stated that,
despite frequent meetings with representatives from other member states' delegations, they find it
difficult to speak as one unified voice in Cuba. 44 As a matter of fact, the Parliament expressed some
frustration in 2008 at the role national interests played in the way the issue of human rights in Cuba
was being treated by EU institutions:
“The European Parliament
37 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
38 Information on the Council's working groups can be found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/preparatory-bodies/
39 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
40 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels, and interview with an official from the EU 
Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
41 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels, and interview with an official from the EU 
Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
42 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
43 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
44 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
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[...]
• Regrets that the existence of intra-EU disagreements on policies towards a
given country such as Cuba or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise
major partners such as Russia have led the EU to adopt only ‘informal sanctions’
in Presidency Conclusions, reflecting an unbalanced or inconsistent application of
EU sanctions”
(Committee on Foreign Affairs 2008)
Once the Council agreed on a negotiation mandate, the EEAS was then able to inform the Cuban
side of the possibility to start negotiations. The Cuban government quickly agreed, 45 and
negotiations finally began at the end of April 2014. The work between the two parties is ongoing
and involves close cooperation among several EU institutions, as will be explained in the next
section.
7.4 Human rights in the negotiation process
EU negotiations with third countries develop through a series of chapters, which means that the
formation of the negotiation table can vary depending on which chapter is being discussed. For
example, when the trade chapter is opened in negotiations with Cuba, somebody from the
department of Trade in the Commission will be present. 46 This setting ensures close cooperation
between the EEAS and other departments of the Commission. It is interesting to notice how both an
official of the EEAS and one from the Commission's Department of Trade often referred to the
EEAS simply as “Commission” during the interview, and they also referred to each other as
“colleagues”. 47 The official from the EEAS also explained how, in a way, the new setting that
derived from the Treaty of Lisbon complicated coordination issues between the two bodies, since
they are now based in two different buildings, with two different sets of people. 48
Since 2008/2009, when relations improved again, the EU has not stressed the relevance of civil
and political rights over economic and social ones. While taking measures to engage the Cuban civil
society, the EU Delegation in la Habana is also implementing a series of programmes aimed at
improving the country's capacity in different job sectors. Whereas the text of the agreement on the
45 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
46 However, the chief negotiators will remain the same, an important factor in the development of personal 
relationships.
47 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels and interview with an official from the European 
Commission's Department of Trade, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
48 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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political chapter is still confidential, both officials from the EEAS and the Delegation stressed that
the EU considers human rights indivisible. 49 As the previous chapters have shown, this is different
from what happened in the years preceding 2008, when the EU actively adopted measures to
encourage the protection of civil and political freedoms in the island. This latest period of distension
in EU-Cuba relations, therefore, seems to coincide with a period in which no set of right is given
particular priority by the EU, therefore confirming H1. 
Moreover, it is also important to highlight the role of EU Delegation in clearing up any possible
confusion over the issue of human rights, as well as any other possible issue. Aside from supporting
the negotiating team in Brussels, the Delegation engages in constant dialogue with the Cuban
government in order to help work on the agreements in between rounds of negotiations. 50 As a
matter of fact, explaining the positions behind what has being said in a negotiation round is a key
role for the Delegation, 51 which means H2 is not confirmed for this last period of analysis either.
Since H2 has not been confirmed for any of the periods considered in this research, it seems that
difficulties in establishing fruitful relations between the EU and Cuba cannot be attributed to a
confusion over which sets of rights should be given priority.
49 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels, and interview with an official from the EU 
Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
50 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
51 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
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8. Conclusions
This research has tried to answer the question: how has the European Union (EU) treated the
issue of human rights in negotiations with Cuba since the issuance of its Common Position in 1996?
Using different periods of the EU-Cuba relation, the thesis has highlighted a number of factors that
influence the EU promotion of human rights. Through the analysis of a series of hypotheses, the
impact of a number of variables has been assessed. I will present here the main findings related to
each hypothesis, while also suggesting possible steps for future research in the field.
As far as the first two hypotheses are concerned, it seems clear that there was no particular
confusion over the importance of human rights. The EU Delegation in la Habana plays an important
role in explaining the institution's interests through each step of the current negotiations. Even
before the Delegation was opened, the documents issued by all EU institutions have generally been
clear on what rights the EU considered particularly important. H2, therefore, has not been confirmed
during the analysis. 
However, it is true that there seems to be a connection between the independent variable “focus
on civil and political rights” and the dependent variable “quality of relationship between EU and
Cuba”. As a matter of fact, H1 has been confirmed for all three time periods considered, as, when
the EU has stressed the relevance of civil and political rights, relations have been particularly
strained. On the other hand, it is also important to consider that those rights have often been linked,
in the EU's discourse, to a change towards democracy. As explained earlier, the Cuban government,
like many other governments around the world, dislikes interference with its internal affairs. 52
Difficulties finding a ZoPA, therefore, could derive more from the EU's insistence on democratic
principles, rather than on the discourse around human rights. Future research could focus on
whether the EU can envision a political system different from Western-style democracies that still
respects the universality and indivisibility of human rights.
Furthermore, the variable “economic adaptations in Cuba” also seems to have a relevant impact
on the dependent variable “EU's openness towards Cuba”. This analysis has shown that the EU has
placed particular importance on the updating of the Cuban economic system, and it has linked it to
its attitude towards the Communist government, therefore confirming H4. However, this research
did not go as far as assessing whether this role of economic openness means that human rights are
given less priority, or if it means that promoting economic openness could help the protection of
52 Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
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human rights.
As far as H5 is concerned, the research has evidenced that there has been a change in the impact
that USA's policies towards Cuba have on the EU's openness towards the island. The variable seems
to have had a relevant impact in the past, but this seems to have changed now. The reason behind
the greater influence of the US in the first period analysed might have been the fact that the Cold
War had ended only recently. It is important to consider that Cuba, thanks to its geographical
position, was strategic to the Soviet Union, especially in the first decades of the Cold War. 53
This thesis has also evidenced the role played by national interests in the way the EU relates to
third countries, predicted by H3. In the case of Cuba, Spain has always had a prominent role, mostly
because of its historical ties with Latin America. 54 It is important to notice, however, that these
national interests are – to a certain extent - connected to which party is in power in the country, as
in the case of Spain. In order to understand this dynamic better, it would be interesting to interview
the people that form the working groups at the Council.
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, an important role in influencing European
countries' views on human rights is played by the level of involvement of civil society in that
country. This does not necessarily depend on the government and has had a particular impact on
countries like Germany and Sweden. Furthermore, this analysis has shown that the EU has followed
the treatment of individuals forming the Cuban civil society closely (e.g. the imprisonment of
dissidents during the Cocktail Wars). Whereas there is no civil society in the “European” sense in
Cuba, 55 individuals are making an increasing effort to organize themselves, especially thanks to
small improvements in the availability of Internet facilities. Future research could therefore focus
on how to involve civil society, both at the EU level and in third countries, in order to ensure better
promotion of human rights.
As far as the behaviour of the single countries is concerned, this research has also highlighted the
important role played by the Eastern enlargement, both in terms of adding countries with different
perspectives to the EU and of changing the way human rights are treated in the institution. As
explained previously, former-Communist countries tended, at the beginning, to be stricter on the
Cuban government. However, this tendency faded out and, at the moment, only two of them are still
stricter than other EU countries (an attitude that could perhaps be attributed to the role of civil
society rather than their Communist history). The impact of the 2004 enlargement on the promotion
53 Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
54 Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
55 Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
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of human rights should be studied further, in order to understand the impact that future
enlargements could have on the issue.
In conclusion, the main factors that have impacted the EU promotion of human rights in Cuba in
the last two decades have been national interests, the focus on civil and political rights and Cuba's
economic openness. The USA's policy towards the island had an impact at the beginning of the
period studied, but it does not have a great influence anymore. On the other hand, it is clear that no
confusion can be attributed to the EU on which human rights should be given priority. The analysis
has also brought up other factors that could have been relevant and that could be ground for future
research: the link between human rights and democracy, the involvement of civil society
organizations and the role of the enlargement in changing the EU's discourse on human rights. Also,
more attention should be paid to whether the link between human rights promotion and economic
measures is helpful or not.
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List of Acronyms
ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific states
EEAS – European External Action Service
EP – European Parliament
EU – European Union
ICCPR - International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR - International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
MEP – Member of the European Parliament
US(A)56 – United States of America
ZoPA – Zone of Possible Agreement
56 Both US and USA were used in the thesis.
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Interviews
• Brief conversation with Vice-President Mogherini, (16 April 2015) The Hague.
• Interview with an official from the EEAS, (6 May 2015) Brussels.
• Interview with an official from the European Commission's Department of Trade, (6 May
2015) Brussels.
• Interview with President Prodi, (8 May 2015) over the phone.
• Interview with an official from the EU Delegation in la Habana, (18 May 2015) La Habana.
• Interview with Professor Pronk, (1 June 2015) The Hague.
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Appendix I: Interviews
When analysing a negotiation process, interviews are key to understanding better what goes on
behind the drafting of official documents and agreements. For the purposes of this thesis, it was
important to gather information on past and present negotiations, both within the EU and between
the EU and Cuba. For this reason, talking to officials of the EEAS was particularly relevant, as they
are the main negotiators on the EU's side and they often coordinate intra-EU discussions on external
relations. As far as the EU-Cuba relations are concerned, this work is carried out by the department
of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean in Brussels, and by the Delegation in La Habana.
The protocols for the interviews with officials from these two institutions can be found at the end of
this appendix. 
Furthermore, the interview with an official from the Commission's Trade Department helped
understand the link between the trade chapter of the negotiations to the issue of human rights. The
same protocol of the interview with an official from the EEAS was used, but the interview was less
structured. On the other hand, as was confirmed by an MEP from Italy, the European Parliament
has not been officially involved in the process of negotiations with Cuba yet. Therefore, interviews
with current MEPs would not have been particularly relevant for this thesis. 
On the other hand, talking to high-level (former) officials and politicians, namely President Prodi,
Vice-President Mogherini and former Minister Pronk, was key to understanding the main ideals
underpinning the work of the EU or, in the case of Prof. Pronk, of an EU country. These interviews
were not as structured as those with the officials from the EEAS and the Commission, as the
purpose was more to listen to personal experiences, rather than to gather specific pieces of
information. Therefore, no protocol is available, but the interview with President Prodi was
focussed on the Eastern enlargement and the issue of human rights, while the interview with Prof.
Pronk touched on a wide range of issues, going from the relationship between the Netherlands and
Cuba in the 1970s to the recent opening of the US towards the Communist country. In the case of
Vice-President Mogherini, she provided some information on her visit to Cuba during an extremely
brief private conversation at the end of her lecture at the University of Leiden, on 16th April 2015.
53
Caterina Manzi MSc International Relations and Diplomacy Master Thesis
Interview Protocol I (official from the EEAS)
EU institutions
What is the role of the EEAS in negotiations with Cuba? How does the EEAS relate to other EU 
institutions on the matter?
Are there different interests and perspectives within the EU and how are they articulated?
How was the recent round of negotiations initiated?
Who initiated it? (Cuba/EU? Which EU institution?)
Was the Common Position discussed within the EU before initiating it?
The “practical” side of negotiating with Cuba
Do you feel that Cuban negotiators have a different style of conducting negotiations than European 
negotiators?
Do you feel that there are different styles of conducting negotiations within the EU and especially 
the EEAS?
Can you guide me through a typical round of negotiations with Cuba? 
Example questions:
How are the date and location chosen?
How does a negotiation start?
Is there a fixed programme for the negotiation (agenda, breaks, end-time, etc...)?
Human rights
How (and when) do you introduce the issue of human rights with Cuban negotiators?
Do you discuss specific rights/sets of rights that are important to the EU?
How do Cuban negotiators discuss the issue?
Do you use reports that show the human rights situation in the country?
How is Cuban civil society involved in the process? Do you have negotiations with Cuban NGOs?
US-Cuba
Have recent developments in the US-Cuba relationship affected EU-Cuba negotiations? How?
Does the issue of the US-Cuba relationship come up during negotiations? If so, in which way?
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Interview Protocol II (official from the EU Delegation in La Habana)
EU Institutions 
What's the role of the EU delegation in Cuba? How is the Delegation involved in the recent rounds
of negotiations?
Are there different interests and perspectives within the EU and how are they articulated?
Is there a common front of the Eastern countries?
The “practical” side of negotiating with Cuba
Is there a cultural difference in the way Cubans and Europeans approach negotiations?
How are negotiations on the political chapter conducted?
Past relations
Why there were years when EU-Cuba relation were so difficult before 2009?
Human rights
Are there specific rights the EU is trying to promote?
Probe about two different sets of human rights
There are many other countries that don't respect human rights but with which EU has “normal”
relations. Is there a difference here because Cuba is communist?
Do you ever deal with the Cuban civil society? Does that cause political problems with the
government (e.g. Cocktail Wars)?
US-Cuba
Does the relationship between Cuba and the US influence the one between the EU and Cuba?
The economic system
Is Cuba introducing new economic measures?
Was the change in the EU's attitude due to the transfer of power from Fidel to Raul?
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